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Abstract 
This paper describes a community crime prevention program in China, set against a background 
of rapid economic development, large internal population migration and increasing crime rates.  
Traditional social control in China has been transformed in order to adapt to the new reform era yet 
some mechanisms remain intact. Crime prevention measures and strategies resemble those adopted in 
the West, but the differences, constituting the so-called ‘Chinese characteristics’ with community crime 
prevention are significant.  
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China seems to be the prototype of a communitarian society and is known for its unique style of 
social control (Liu, 2005b; Zhang et al., 1996).  The whole of Chinese society is organized through the 
basic units of family, neighborhood and work unit, with the household registration system (hukou) 
playing a pivotal role (Chen, 2002; Lau, 2001; Zhang & Messner, 1999).  This ‘bottom up’ structure 
combined with informal social control can be contrasted with the ‘top down’ structure in the West.  As 
Troyer, Clark, & Rojek (1989:3) pointed out in their seminal work, “China’s social control system 
weaves together a unique combination of formal and informal methods, with a strong focus on the 
latter…the key to understanding Chinese society’s low crime rate is the controls exerted over citizens at 
the grass-roots level”.  The notable social control apparatus is the neighborhood committee served by its 
mediation and public security committees, taking charge of both bangjiao (literally ‘help and educate’, 
community after-care of ex-offenders) and tiaojie (mediation).   
With the launch of economic reform and the open-door policy in the 1980s, China has 
undergone unprecedented changes. In parallel with this rapid economic growth and social development 
has been increased population mobility, especially from rural to urban. For example, in 2005 the 
migrant population was estimated to be 150 million, accounting for 11.5% of the total population in the 
country (National Statistical Bureau, 2006).  This large migrant population has a substantial impact on 
the household registration system and grass-roots social control mechanisms. During the reform era 
soaring crime rates, deteriorating social order and increased levels of fear of crime have arisen (Chang, 
1990; Liu, 2005a). A crucial question is how the once highly acclaimed grass-roots social control 
mechanisms have coped with all the social change and to what extent it is still functional in controlling 
crime.  
This study attempts to answer this question by examining a community crime prevention 
program called Building Little Safe and Civilized Communities (BLSCC) in Shenzhen, a vanguard city 
of economic reform and opening-up in China. The examination of BLSCC is based on officially 
released documents, yearbooks, and fieldwork by the first author in five communities. We first briefly 
review the literature about the theories and practices of community crime prevention in the West, 
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paving the way to explore to what extent BLSCC demonstrates the ‘Chinese characteristics’ touted by 
officials.  We then briefly describe the five communities in order to help understand the context of 
BLSCC. This is followed by a brief description of the general crime prevention policy in China, 
comprehensive management of social order (CMSO), in order to understand the background for the 
launch of BLSCC. The important measures in implementing BLSCC are provided in detail next.  We 
conclude by discussing the so-called ‘Chinese characteristics’ and the implications for general crime 
prevention.   
 
Community Crime Prevention 
Hope (1995) defined community prevention as activities designed to change the social 
conditions that foster crime. While the stress on ‘social conditions’ is consistent with practice, 
community crime prevention is not confined to only intervening in ‘crime in residential communities’. 
As acknowledged there are overlaps between community, situational and developmental prevention 
approaches. Thus community crime prevention crosses the borders between situational and social 
prevention, as well as between developmental and situational prevention, with a focus on social 
relationships both within and beyond individual communities (Ekblom & Pease, 1995). 
The community approach to crime prevention has gone through three non-exclusive phases, with 
the first stressing the significance of informal social control on crime and disorder inside individual 
communities, the second oriented around the opportunity reduction model (or situational crime 
prevention), and the third emphasizing the partnership approach including community policing and 
problem-solving policing.  
The emphasis on the strengthening of informal social control as a remedy to high crime rates can 
be traced back to the Chicago School of Criminology in the early 1920s. ‘Social disorganization’, (i.e. 
weakened informal social control), as a result of neighborhood structural characteristics such as poverty, 
racial and ethnic heterogeneity, and residential mobility, explained high crime rates in the communities. 
Thus, to reduce community crime problems, informal social control should be strengthened. Programs 
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such as Neighborhood Watch and Citizens Patrol were guided by this rationale. However, the existence 
of social networks does not necessarily produce effective social action, especially crime prevention 
(Sampson, 2004:159).  
Crime prevention by opportunity reduction is premised on the thesis that crime can be prevented 
through reducing opportunities for specific categories of crime – by increasing the associated risks and 
difficulties and reducing the rewards. However, its emphasis on target-hardening and physical aspects 
of the community has invoked criticism (e.g. Crawford, 1998; Rosenbaum 1988; Rosenbaum, Lurigio, 
& Davis, 1998). Cohen (1985:148) criticized ‘situational crime prevention’ as influenced by the 
emergence of new behaviorism especially asocial ‘gated communities’.  The gain in personal protection 
by risk avoidance and risk management behaviors seems to be purchased at a high price: a loss of 
movement freedom, a lower quality of life, and higher levels of fear of crime. Although the risk of 
crime is distributed according to routine activities and lifestyle many people simply do not have other 
choices. Withdrawal of many residents from social interaction for the purpose of minimizing risks 
adversely undermines the community’s ability to exercise informal social control and surveillance over 
public space, thus lowering the constraints against deviant and criminal behavior. Similarly those 
engaged in household protection behaviors are generally from higher income brackets, older, more 
educated and more likely to be homeowners. The expansion of the private security industry, leading to 
the commercialization of safety (see e.g. Shearing & Stenning, 1987), has been another prominent 
change. Thus displacement of crime risks to the socially and economically disadvantaged has occurred 
(Rosenbaum et al., 1998; Crawford, 1998).  
The partnership approach results from the perceived failure of the criminal justice system to 
control crime. Thus crime control is not the sole responsibility of the criminal justice system; the role of 
other government agencies and the general public is crucial. In contrast to the traditional 
compartmentalized response to crime, especially the police solution to crime, it proposes a holistic 
approach to crime.  Through partnership the problems and needs of the community are identified. Most 
notably, the diagnoses of community problems are formulated by grass-roots citizens and local 
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agencies, rather than by external agencies: bottom-up rather than top-down, or ‘bubble-up’ rather than 
‘trickle-down’. In the process of solving the problems and meeting the needs, community safety is ‘co-
produced’ (Schneider, 1987). 
With ‘broken windows’ providing the theoretical foundation (Keeling & Cole, 1996), problem-
oriented policing or community policing gained favor among policy makers, (Rosenbaum et al., 1998). 
One important tenet of community or problem-oriented policing is to identify problems based on the 
needs of the community residents, and then to deal with those problems with the cooperation and 
participation of the residents and other related agencies. Rosenbaum et al. (1998:193) argued the 
process ‘‘involves more than simply ‘solving problems’” and ‘the major problem to be solved is one of 
mutual trust and respect between the police and the citizenry’. Skogan et al. (2000) demonstrate how 
police leadership was the key in implementing community policing in Chicago. With the engagement of 
the public, the police and the rest of the criminal justice system, and other government branches, it is 
possible to establish ‘policing as a public good’ (Loader & Walker, 2001). Through partnerships, 
individual communities and their residents are connected to sources external to the communities. In this 
sense, partnership enriches and deepens the meaning of community crime prevention.  
Skogan (1990) notes that certain features of American society severely limit the potential 
effectiveness of community crime prevention efforts, such as cultural diversity, high mobility and 
strong orientation towards individual rights rather than collective responsibilities which make it difficult 
for neighborhood residents to reach consensus about the need to take specific action, to mobilize, and to 
work together. By examining the community crime prevention program of BLSCC in China, we see 
how community crime prevention develops in the fertile communitarian soil of Chinese society.   
 
Comprehensive Management of Social Order: A Duality 
CMSO emerged in the early 1980s when the party leadership was concerned about rising crime, 
and strived to attach equal importance on ‘Spiritual Civilization’ as well as ‘Material Civilization’ in 
socialist construction. The guiding principle of CMSO is ‘combining punishment and prevention, with 
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the focus on prevention’, and its final goal ‘to fundamentally improve social order’. It has been 
summarized into six words ‘strike, prevent, educate, manage, construct, and reform’. Basically, the six 
aspects represent the duality of ‘punitive’ (strike and reform) and ‘preventive’ (prevent, educate, 
manage, and construct) approaches. Although the focus should be on prevention, in reality the punitive 
aspect overwhelms the preventive primarily because of an abrupt increase in crime (see Zhong, 1999; 
Fu, 1994).  
Agencies in charge of CMSO were established at every level of the government and Party. In 
March 21, 1991, the Committee on Comprehensive Management of Social Order under the Party 
Central Committee was established with the responsibility of ‘assisting the Party Central Committee 
and the State Council to lead the national work on CMSO’. Regulations and laws on CMSO were then 
promulgated by the Party Committee and at every level of government (Zhong, 1999; Lu & Zhao, 
1999). For example, in Shenzhen the Municipal Committee on CMSO was established in May 1991, 
with the Municipal Deputy Party Secretary and Chairman of the Municipal People’s Congress as its 
director. Later in the same year, the Committee on CMSO at the district level was established.  
CMSO has been in effect for nearly 15 years, surviving several ‘waves’ of crime and crime 
policies in China. According to Wang, Wang, Luo, & Jiao (1998: 332-8), the basic experience of 
CMSO can be summarized by four aspects: (1) uphold the leadership of the Party and government; (2) 
adhere to the responsibility system of ‘whoever is in charge is held responsible’; (3) stick to the 
principle of ‘treating both the causes and the symptoms but emphasizing the treatment of the 
symptoms’; and (4) follow the credo of ‘incorporating the special work (of the criminal justice system) 
and the mass line’.  
 
BLSCC and Its Development in Shenzhen 
Shenzhen was originally a fishing village bordering Hong Kong. It was designated as one of the 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in 1980, and the ‘window’ of the reform and opening-up of China. It 
has made remarkable economic strides and became a ‘Mecca’ for migrants especially those from rural 
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areas seeking jobs. Thus it had an increasing proportion of migrants, and by 2004 among its population 
of 5.98 million, 4.32 million are migrants.  
Shenzhen’s rapid development ran parallel to an increasingly serious crime problem. The 
solution reached by the Party committee and government in Shenzhen was that ‘from an objective point 
of view the increase in social order problems is unavoidable, and no one can reverse this inexorable 
trend. What can and should be done is keep the degree of increase under control, so as not to endanger 
social development and stability’ (Huang & Luo, 1997:5). Following the call from the Central 
Government to apply the CMSO approach to crime, the BLSCC gradually took shape in Shenzhen.  
A ‘little safe and civilized community’ (LSCC) is two-pronged and neither can be 
overemphasized at the expense of the other (Chu & Wang, 1998:672). In terms of safety, residents 
should feel safe, with few serious public security cases, and general public security cases kept under 
control. In terms of civilization, active politics, economy, culture, education, hygiene and so on was 
required. Thus in a LSCC in Shenzhen, there must be a strong conformity to law and regulation, public 
order is good, the degree of civilization is high, the social morale is upright, the environment is 
beautiful and the neighborhood relationship is harmonious (Huang & Luo, 1997:5). For a little 
community to be eligible for LSCC it should meet these criteria and go through a complicated rating 
process. The rating classifies the communities into model, advanced, pass or failure, on a yearly, instead 
of a one-off basis. If a community fails to meet the standards in the second year, it is stripped of the 
original level. It can also strive to upgrade to a higher level in subsequent years. 
The program of BLSCC underwent a gradual process of development summarized in Table 1. 
For the second three-year plan, the guiding principle was to enhance ‘large area stability’ through 
maintaining ‘little community peace’, that is to transcend from building ‘little communities’ into ‘large 
areas’ and even the whole city. This final step was hailed as a significant step forward in further 
maintaining ‘safety’ and ‘civilization’ by keeping the momentum of BLSCC.  
Table 1 inserted here 
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Fieldwork in Five Communities: Model versus Non-model 
The first author visited five communities, represented as A, B, C, D, and E in order to maintain 
confidentiality. Community A is a model in implementing BLSCC, and a paradigm for housing reform, 
estate development and management in China. It was even designated as ‘China’s First Civilized 
Village’, and received VIPs including former President Jiang Zhemin on December 5, 1995. It has over 
6,016 households with more than 30,000 residents among whom nearly 20,000 hold permanent 
Shenzhen residence status. A large proportion of residents are civil servants or employees in the State 
Owned Enterprises (SOE). Community A was administered by the Office of Housing Management 
(OHM) affiliated to a large estate company, rather than by the popular local Neighborhood Committee. 
The Neighborhood Committee was overshadowed because the OHM took charge of all the important 
aspects, for example, security. The Neighborhood Committees remained responsible for military 
conscription, family planning, and local elections in the community.  
Community B once a rural village earned a pass in BLSCC. The reform era saw village annual 
income increase astronomically after its farming land was taken over by the government to build a very 
large industrial belt. Its residents were financially compensated and granted urban hukou status. Since 
1984 a huge number of migrant workers came to the village and various service industries were 
developed to cater for the large number of factory workers from the neighboring industry belt. So a 
village enterprise was created to oversee its own manufacturing factories, markets, and retail stores. 
During fieldwork, there were over 800 permanent residents (250 households) and 9,695 temporary 
residents in community B.  
Community C also earned a pass in BLSCC. It was established in 1984 by the municipal 
government to provide subsidized accommodation to workers of SOEs. At the time of the fieldwork, 
there were 1,360 households including 4,078 residents in 16 buildings most of whom held temporary 
residence status. The income level of the residents was average and a substantial number of residents 
were laid-off workers. Crime used to be a very severe problem, especially burglary. Among the 
residents there was a saying ‘if you have not been burglarized, you don’t belong to community C’. The 
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community was managed by a Neighborhood Committee that had adapted to the need for a different 
role in grass-root governance.  
Community D also got a pass in BLSCC. It used to be a village and was urbanized during the 
reform era. It was well-known locally as a ‘mistress village’ because many Hong Kong men purchased 
flats in that village to stay with their mistresses. Although the community was visited a request to do 
fieldwork was rejected. The streets were dirty and lined with various kinds of shops and sauna parlors. 
Similar to community B, its population was dominated by migrant workers. Apart from the alleged 
prosperity of the local sex industry, this community was troubled by crime.  
Community E also got a BLSCC pass and was developed by the government to cater for the 
residents in the ‘three-no tribes’. The ‘three nos’ literally mean no valid legal documents, no legitimate 
job, and no legal residence, and refers to many migrant workers.  Some migrants, unable or unwilling to 
pay for housing, put up shacks and other makeshift shelters while others made money by building such 
shelters to rent to desperate migrants. Some ‘tribes’ became hotspots for criminal activities (such as 
manufacturing bogus food, drinks and other fake products), havens for criminals and fugitives, and 
warehouses for stolen goods.  To address these problems the Shenzhen government started building 
cheap temporary housing estates to accommodate migrant workers in every district. Community E is 
such a housing estate with 65 buildings including 1,500 flats. A request to interview the local cadres and 
residents was rejected. Conditions in community E were in stark contrast to those found in community 
A. 
 
BLSCC Measures 
The important measures in implementing BLSCC can be basically grouped into four aspects: 
organizational features (ideological basis, leadership responsibility system, mass prevention and mass 
management, and fund raising), safety measures (police, private security, situational measures, and 
management of the floating population), civilization measures (moral education, promoting harmonious 
  11
relationship, building community culture, and purification of the environment), and the BLSCC rating 
system.  
 
Organization 
At the outset, BLSCC emerged from the broader perspectives of the construction of spiritual 
civilization and the general crime policy CMSO. In fact it gained legitimacy and momentum by 
anchoring onto these two essential doctrines of the socialist system. BLSCC bears distinctive marks of 
popular ideology. Its slogans and methods are directly transplanted from the larger perspective, ranging 
from the leadership responsibility system, the principle of ‘whoever takes charge is held responsible’, 
‘learning from models’, the setting of BLSCC yearly quotas, the strategy of ‘mass prevention and mass 
management’, through to the complicated rating system.  
The leadership responsibility system is regarded as the key to CMSO and maintaining stability. 
In the official reports on BLSCC, it is always listed first in any successful implementation and is 
directly associated with the leaders’ year-end assessment, eligibility for ‘model’ titles, and promotion.  
For example in 1998 three units were singled out for criticism and the responsible persons of the units 
were given ‘one vote negating all’. Some local level leaders were re-assigned and a local police chief 
dismissed.  This was hailed as a breakthrough for the CMSO assessment work (Shenzhen Political and 
Legal Yearbook [SZPLY], 1999:135). However, it was easier to ‘negate’ the small units than the large 
units and easier to ‘negate’ the units than the unit leaders (Wang et al. 1998:352). It is more difficult in 
private and joint enterprises because of the reliance on administrative discipline. Another problem of the 
leadership responsibility system is that there is a ‘lack of synergy, coordination and cooperation 
between different agencies’ (SZPLY, 1998:206).  
Mass prevention and mass management, literally means the masses, all social forces, and all 
government agencies are mobilized to control and prevent crime. This is one of the important principles 
of CMSO, and is followed everywhere in China. BLSCC in essence is mass work and grassroots level 
work (Huang & Luo, 1997). Although the popular understanding of the approach of mass prevention 
  12
emphasizes the mobilization of all forces for joint action, another dimension is to mobilize individuals 
or work units to employ crime prevention measures either inside households or work units, as 
represented by the slogan of ‘manage well your own matters and watch out your own doors’.  
The LSCC is not limited to residential areas and all sorts of little communities become the locus 
for people to organize together. In the process, the ‘special organs’ (police and other criminal justice 
agencies, neighborhood committees, joint prevention team, mediation committee, public legal education 
team, bangjiao team, internal public security agencies) combine with the public (residents, work unit 
employees, and students) in a concerted way. Meanwhile, the mass media, such as newspapers, TV and 
radio stations publicize the launch and progress of BLSCC, reporting model individuals or work units, 
and even covering certain problems.  
The approach of mass prevention and mass management is in line with the cherished tradition of 
combining ‘special organs with the mass line’. It is also responding to the inadequate policing and 
financial resources in communities (Chu &Wang, 1998). In the West, one of the significant challenges 
is how to organize the public. In China, this has become increasingly difficult as the market economy 
has grown.  The ideological basis of mass prevention, reliant on voluntarism, now seems fragile. 
Learning from Leifeng1 has simply become a source of ridicule (Bakken, 2000). Yang (1998) identified 
problems in implementing mass prevention in Shanghai, such as the lack of a legal basis and law 
enforcement authority, the quantity and quality of the personnel, and lack of funding and equipment.  
Multi-agency cooperation, an essential part of the mass approach, is also problematic. In the 
West, this is acknowledged widely in crime prevention programs. For example, Sampson, Stubbs & 
Smith (1988:491) noted that the multi-agency approach should not be uncritically considered as a 
panacea for crime. Instead of an overblown, all-encompassing, multi-agency approach they advocate a 
‘narrowly focused approach, with specific forms of inter-agency relationships, on specific themes and 
problems’. Crawford (1998) also identified important tensions between managerialist preoccupations of 
policy and the rhetoric of multi-agency partnerships.  
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Since 1997 funding for BLSCC in Shenzhen is derived from four sources: one part from the City 
Government, one part from the units, one part from the residents and households, and one part from 
charges on ‘convenience services’.  The official line is that funding for the BLSCC has been resolved. 
In community A, the government invested heavily to establish it as a national model. The property 
company also invested heavily to make it an effective self advertisement. All the service industries 
inside the community paid management fees and residents were relatively better off, so there is little 
problem in raising funds for BLSCC. The OHM actively participated in all sorts of ‘income creating’ 
(Chuangshou) activities.  
Community B faired worse than A but better than other communities. The government funding 
was fixed but it was not designated as a key BLSCC target, so no extra funding was provided. But it 
could gather funds from the large number of factories and enterprises situated inside the community. 
The community cadres stated that although the residents were wealthy they seldom paid extra fees for 
BLSCC. But they could charge certain kinds of services, e.g. cleaning and hygiene.  The most 
disadvantaged was community C. The cadre complained that ‘their feet and hands were bound’ and the 
community was on the verge of dysfunction because of a lack of funding. Since the income of the 
residents was not high and some residents were laid off, it was very difficult to collect management 
fees. As a residential community there were no ‘beneficial work units’ for the neighborhood committee 
to charge fees. They were eager to ‘create income’ by offering certain services, for example charging 
for car-parking, and opening small convenience stores. But they could not get approval from higher-
level government. So based on the experience of the three communities, how funding for BLSCC was 
resolved depended on the community’s resources, both internal and external.  
 
Measures for Safety 
The Shenzhen Public Security Bureau (PSB) was established in March 1979. The police-public 
rate in 1995 was 244 per 100,000, much higher than the estimated national rate of 117 per 100,000 in 
the early 1990s. Since the beginning, the PSB have actively taken the lead in the BLSCC program. They 
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were involved in installing target-hardening crime preventions measures, e.g. the ‘three preventions’ 
(prevention by people, by techniques, and by products) and the ‘three irons’ (iron windows, iron doors, 
and iron cabinets). They play an important role in managing the migrant population via the hukou 
system. They also manage ‘special professions’, like entertainment venues (i.e. dancing halls, sauna and 
massage parlors), hotels, second-hand dealers, and the publishing industry. The PSB also link BLSCC 
with wiping out ‘pornography, gambling and drugs’: one of the important criteria for BLSCC is ‘no 
drug addicts, no drug abuse dens and no drug abuse network’ (SZPLY, 1998).  
To better adapt to the tasks of BLSCC and CMSO, the PSB actively adopted a series of tactics. 
The officers at the local PSB stations engaged in ‘four a’s’ activity: ‘to have a walk household by 
household, to have a meeting with the male, the female, the old and the young, to say a hello when 
everything is under control, and to have a thorough handling when problems are detected’ (SZPLY, 
1998:12). The local officers also conducted the ‘four haves’ activity: ‘to have a thorough understanding 
of the beat situation, to have a good relationship with the beat public, to have a stable team for the 
management of beat public security, and to have a fundamental improvement of beat public security’ 
(SZPLY, 1998:136).  Consequently local PSB officers are one of the important assessment targets of 
BLSCC.  
The PSB also have become directly involved in maintaining private security in enterprises in 
China .The establishment of the first private ‘security service company’ (SSC, bao’an fuwu gongsi) 
occurred in 1985 at the Shekou Industrial Zone of Shenzhen and was a compromise made between the 
companies and the PSB. SSCs are under the tight control of the PSB, including establishment, 
recruitment, organization, and profit. In BLSCC, security guards contribute to ‘safety’ and ‘civilization’ 
in the communities. All the communities employed security guards, mostly decommissioned soldiers. 
Community A has about 30,000 residents and employed 150 security guards; community B 10,500 
residents and 41 security guards; community C 4,078 residents and 10 security guards. The cadre in 
community C complained that the number is inadequate, but they could not employ more because of 
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financial difficulties. Regardless of the importance placed on security guards, there is concern that 
SCCs were not well regulated, and the security guards were often poorly trained.  
Similar to the West, situational measures were adopted to minimize the opportunities for crime. 
Among the different types of communities, some are ‘closed or gated’ style, others ‘half-closed’, and 
still others ‘open’ style, according to their geography and functions. Thus, during the process of 
BLSCC, measures similar to ‘defensible space’ and ‘crime prevention through environmental design’ 
were carried out. In some communities, fences were established; community entries and exits were re-
designed and electronically controlled anti-burglary doors, infra-red detectors, and CCTV installed. To 
‘design out’ crime ‘illegal structures’ were demolished, as in community B, which was also an 
important means for managing migrants and a useful way to make the community look more ‘civilized’.  
Substantial emphasis was put on promoting residents’ ‘prevention awareness’. Retired residents 
were organized as superintendents of individual staircases, buildings, and blocks. Regular patrolling by 
both ‘security defense teams’ and security guards were arranged. These measures should be understood 
in historical context. In the ‘golden age’ of the 1950s, ‘doors were unbolted at night and no one 
pocketed anything found on the road’. Previously, in the traditional compound house (siheyuan), several 
families lived side by side and there was no need to close the doors. In the low-rise buildings, the 
staircases inside the buildings were open to all, which inadvertently gave potential criminals easier 
access to the households. Open buildings of this kind are still common in inland areas.  
This kind of prevention came at a price as in the West. Communication and interactions between 
neighbors have become much less frequent. In community A, some old people complained that they 
hated the iron doors because it imposed a distance between neighbors and people seemed more selfish, 
per the traditional Chinese idiom, ‘Each person should sweep the snow from his own doorsteps and 
should not fret about the frost on his neighbor’s roof’.  
The Shenzhen government has treated the management of migrants as a top priority. Managing 
the ‘floating’ migrant population was crucial to the success of BLSCC because they reportedly commit 
a disproportionately high amount of crime in their destination cities and place pressure on public health 
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and order (SZPLY, 1999:224). Migrants, especially the ‘three nos’ and those from certain places are 
supposedly more prone to committing crime in Shenzhen, e.g. Sichuan, Hunan, Hubei, Henan and 
Guangxi. The need to manage migrants required the hukou system to be adjusted to allow temporary 
hukou or residence permits issued by Shenzhen PSB. A migrant to enter Shenzhen must apply for a 
border pass from the local PSB of her home province and this inadvertently gave rise to human 
smuggling and fake border passes. Efforts to limit the issue of border passes by the migrants’ original 
provinces have been limited because of the huge economic disparity between Shenzhen and inland areas 
(SZPLY, 1998:206). Other measures include the internal or second border established in 1986 to protect 
Shenzhen SEZ, oversight by landlords, providing a dedicated ‘leading team’, targeting migrants who 
violate family planning policy, deportation, legal education, and temporary settlement areas. However, 
to a large extent, the settlement areas became a concentration of the marginally employed, ‘underclass’ 
and the ‘undesirable’. They are the slums of modern Chinese cities, excluding the migrants socially and 
economically (see Community E).   
 
Measures for Civilization 
As discussed earlier the promotion of civilization is as important as that of safety in BLSCC. If 
safety is overemphasized at the expense of civilization, there will be no long-lasting public security and 
stability. The stress on civilization reflects the nationwide campaign on the construction of spiritual 
civilization and the launching of annual campaigns. An inverse relationship between the construction of 
spiritual civilization and the level of crime is assumed (Gui, 1998). In BLSCC the following measures 
are implemented to promote civilization levels at the community: a. Moral education; b. Promoting 
harmonious relationships; c. Building community culture; d. Purification of the environment.  
Moral education is focused on enhancing the individuals’ awareness and compliance to socialist 
moral rules and Party/government policies. This kind of moral education is achieved through launching 
seasonal campaigns, with the ‘driving force’ being to ‘evaluate and select’ ‘model’ or ‘civilized’ 
individuals or units. Crime is a morally charged problem in China and policy towards the phenomena of 
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‘pornography, gambling and drugs’ reflects this. BLSCC also promotes good relationships and mutual 
help between neighbors. Residents are encouraged to actively fight crime and other social evils.  
Building community culture seems to be an all-encompassing concept of civilization. At certain 
occasions it seems to overlap with the moral education. Roughly put, it aims to enrich community social 
life and enhance the residents’ knowledge by organizing various recreational and educational activities. 
For example, in community A, there is a special ‘department of community culture’ and community A 
is famous for such activities. In communities B and C, all the cadres mentioned some activities either 
for youth or the elderly. In BLSCC “every little community is a battlefield. If socialist culture, which 
advocates and extols ‘the true, the good and the beautiful’ does not occupy it, ugly and corrupted 
ideology, and unhealthy trends and evil practices will get a chance to get in” (SZPLY, 1999:225).  
The civilization of the community is also embodied in its physical environment. In BLSCC, 
measures were adopted to clean, improve and ‘purify’ the environment. For example, one of the 
achievements in BLSCC was improvement of the environment by creating greenbelts, paving roads and 
removing rubbish. The stress on the improvement of the physical environment is based on the strong 
belief that the physical environment has a great impact on people’s moral and mental health.  
 
Rating System and Outcomes 
A complicated rating system of the BLSCC was introduced in 1995 and revised in 1996. The 
‘five standards of BLSCC in Shenzhen’ refers to the following aspects: (1) political stability, stability 
and unity in the community, and good ideological and political quality of the residents; (2) good public 
security, and security and prevention measures adopted; (3) standard management of public facilities, 
clean and hygienic public places, and responsibility system implemented to ensure ‘hygienic streets, 
orderly environment, and purification and greenbelts’; (4) sound grassroots level organization, good 
grassroots level work, close relationship between the cadres, the public, the military, and the police, 
normal relationship between the management and the workers, amiable relationship between neighbors 
and harmonic relationship between family members; and (5) good standards in community spiritual 
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civilization, and measures of ideological construction and cultural construction carried out (SZPLY, 
1997: 217).  
Whenever a campaign was completed, the government reported via the mass media success 
stories in general terms such as ‘greatly improved’, ‘markedly decreased’, ‘substantial achievement’, 
and ‘our investigation shows that the masses are very satisfied with the campaign’. The BLSCC reports 
in Shenzhen are full of yearly achievements and statistics, e.g. how many communities were rated 
‘pass’ or ‘model’, how much money was invested, how much hardware was installed, and how many 
people were organized, among other things. These achievements are based on the information submitted 
by the local communities. Given the ‘responsibility system’ local leaders have a strong desire to portray 
a positive picture.  There were two surveys conducted in 1995 and in 1998 but details of the 
methodology were not available. The 1998 survey was summarized by the Deputy City Party Secretary 
at the first three-year plan meeting in April 1998: 
 
‘One of the achievements lies in the marked improvement of public security. In all the little 
communities built so far, all kinds of cases decreased 50% compared with the same period prior 
to their building. Inside 848 little communities, no criminal cases occurred. All these built a 
foundation for the stability and betterment of public security citywide. The masses’ feeling of 
safety has greatly increased. We conducted a survey with a sample of over 30,000 people, and 
95% of the masses and foreign businessmen answered that they have feeling of safety’ (SZPLY, 
1999: 225). 
 
Conclusion 
We quoted the official documents and native commentary for the sake of providing an original 
flavor to those who are unfamiliar with Chinese discourse on social control and crime prevention.  
BLSCC has emerged in a particular political and ideological context. With economic success achieved, 
the government emphasized that material and spiritual civilization should be pursued simultaneously. 
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Due to the escalation of crime associated with economic development the CMSO approach was 
adopted. The ‘get-tough’ aspect of punishment of the CMSO however, did not produce the results 
desired. Thus, the comprehensive approach stressed both punishment and prevention. BLSCC, with its 
focus on prevention, is in contrast to the ‘get-tough’ approach of ‘strike-hard’.  
In terms of the measures adopted, BLSCC, to a large degree, conforms to the situational forms 
of community crime prevention in the West. But considering its social, political and cultural context, its 
‘Chinese characteristics’ are notable. For example, its ideological underpinnings, mass prevention and 
management traditions, responsibility system, various kinds of contracts and pacts, heavy government 
investment (both administrative and financial), and the rating system, make BLSCC distinctive from 
community crime prevention approaches found in the West.  
However, the control measures associated with BLSCC can only be grasped by acknowledging 
both the differences and similarities from the traditional social control mechanisms prior to the 
development of the socialist market economy. All the basic institutions, including hukou, neighborhood 
committees, danwei, and the police, still play a vital role in social control and crime prevention but have 
undergone changes. Hukou, and its association with social welfare, has become less comprehensive in 
the process of economic reform, but it still functions to identify migrants as ‘outside workers’. The 
identification as an outsider leads to exclusion at all levels (Taylor, 1999): economic exclusion from 
labor markets, social exclusion between people in civil society, and the ever-expanding exclusionary 
activities of the criminal justice system and private security.  
Neighborhood committees still function as an important part of the grass-roots organization, but 
are financially restrained and under challenge from newly emerging organizations. The dawei system 
has also undergone the most marked change. Previously dawei, as a social welfare provider, played an 
essential role in social control. But with the opening of the labor market, the state controlled job 
assignment structure has collapsed. Danwei, in foreign-owned, private and joint enterprises, no longer 
have to shoulder a heavy “iron rice bowl” burden (i.e. taking responsibilities for the employee’s social 
welfare). Even the SOEs are starting to shrug off the burden of expensive staff health and welfare. 
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Previously, in danwei, social welfare and social control depended on each other. Now this kind of 
interdependence has been broken. Thus, to take neighborhood committees and danwei together, Troyer 
et al. (1989: 32) were right in stating that ‘neighborhood-level structures appear to be losing their 
influence’. But the prophesy that the workplace would become the locus of control was clearly 
misplaced.  
The PSB still upholds the mass line, and places great emphasis on good relationships with the 
masses. This is embodied in the ‘four a’s’, ‘four haves’ and other similar slogans. But it has actively 
tried to adapt to the new environment and new tasks. Its role of maintaining social order has been partly 
undertaken by private security, although at most a junior partner.  
Given the relevance of culture to the role of social control and the need for social adaptability in 
the wake of the economic reform, the changes and continuities are incremental rather than radical. 
BLSCC incorporates all the forces inside the community, but also taps into the energy and input from 
outside the community. Especially in the second three-year plan, the guiding principle is to link ‘little 
communities’ into several ‘large areas’ citywide, so as to enhance ‘large area stability’ through 
maintaining ‘little community peace’. This clearly transcends reliance alone on internal sources for 
communities. In this process, the state, through all the levels of the Party and the Government, plays an 
important role. The community organizations work with the police and other government agencies, in 
concerted efforts to achieve the goal of ‘safety’ and ‘civilization’ in individual communities.  
In terms of ‘transferability’ (Crawford, 1998), efforts to ‘transplant’ such a program to Western 
society would encounter substantial difficulties. As Skogan (1990) noted the difficulties of 
implementing community policing in Western societies arises from cultural and value differences and it 
is the increasing emergence of differences that may render Chinese efforts at crime prevention less 
effective than in the past.  
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Endnotes 
1 Leifeng, a People’s Liberation Army soldier, was known for doing good deeds and helping 
those in need. He died in the line of duty in 1962 and was decorated in 1963. Since then the month of 
March is designated as ‘Month of Learning from Leifeng’ when people from all walks of life are called 
on to do good deeds and help those in need.  
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Table 1 Development of BLSCC in Shenzhen: 1992-1998 
Seed 1992  pilot study in Xianxi village and Nanshan village 
1993  essential concepts of ‘little’, ‘safety’ and ‘civilization’ emerged.  
 
Bud 1994  Decision on the first three-year plan was made in June.  
 
Blossom 
 
First three- 
year plan 
1995  ‘Five Standards on LSCC’ including ‘Eight Subjects and Forty-five 
Measurement Indicators’ was promulgated 
1996  The above regulation was revised.  
1997  The Notice on BLSCC Funding, the principle of ‘four ones’. 
 
By the end of 1997, 1,499 LSCCs, coverage of 972.1 square kilometers and 
3.35 million people, coverage rates of 50% and 92% respectively. 
 
Fruit 
 
Start of the 
second three-
year plan 
1998  Three regulations on management of floating population were 
promulgated 
 
By the end of 1998, 1,699 LSCCs, coverage of 1,042 square kilometers and 
3.58 million people. Coverage rates of 53% and 94% respectively.  
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